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Aristotle's Metaphysics
by Aristotle
Product Group: Book
Publisher: Indiana University Press (1966-01)
ISBN: 0253309212
EAN: 9780253309211
Paperback: 512 pages
SKU: S070214-1250-DL
Condition: Good
Comments: Very good overall condition. Tight but creased binding. Book has some underlines. Ships same day or next in a bubble mailer. Enjoy.
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Editorial Reviews
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Product Description
Joe Sachs has followed up his success with his translation of Aristotle's Physics, published by Rutgers University Press, with a new translation of Metaphysics. Sachs's translations bring distinguished new light onto Aristotle's works, which are foundational to history of science. Sachs translates Aristotle with an authenticity that was lost when Aristotle was translated into Latin and abstract Latin words came to stand for concepts Aristotle expressed with phrases in everyday Greek language. When the works began being translated into English, those abstract Latin words or their cognates were used, thus suggesting a level of jargon and abstraction, and in some cases misleading interpretation, which was not Aristotle's language or style. These important new translations open up Aristotle's original thought to readers.
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Customer Reviews
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What is The Meaning Of Being?
Rating  (5)
Date: 2008-05-10
0 out of 4 customers found this reveiw helpful
I read this book for a graduate seminar on Aristotle.
Topic of Metaphysics is Ousia=substance and being. What is the meaning of being? With respect to matter and form, it is primarily about form. Analytically both can be separate and distinct, but not in reality. One can analyze matter by potentiality and actuality. Matter can't answer the question of being without form. Some natural things are always a composite of matter and form, it is the answer to the question of what is ousia or being in nature. Matter by itself can't give us the answer to what a thing is.
Ousia=substance and being. Ousia= Being is the "this" spoken of in primary ousia. This is contrary to Plato. Categories vs. Metaphysics. We can talk of the "being" as quality as "not white." Being spoken of in many ways but only of one thing, i.e., "the focal being." Word being has flexibility. Other flexible words is essence. (the what it is to be). In Greek for Aristotle, a bed is not an Ousia because it is from techne=craft it can have an essence. Ousia is reserved for material things self manufactured in nature. All things are derived from a primary ousia.
This has to do with focal being, health is such a word. When we talk about different aspects of health, it is not a universal definition like Socrates looks for. Aristotle says you can't find it. Thus, the word "being" is just a word in a sense a focal point like the word health, i.e. healthy skin, healthy food, then there is health, for Socrates what is health. Aristotle says no, health is unity by analogy. Aristotle is OK with using examples. Math is not independent knowledge, it is dependent on things math is not a primary existence. Being is neither a universal nor a genus, (genus is animal in hierarchy). It is as though Aristotle wants to say that the primary meaning of being is the "this" the subject, i.e. Socrates not human all by itself, not animal all by itself.
Ousia= Being is the "this" spoken of in primary ousia. This is contrary to Plato. Categories vs. Metaphysics. "This" is ontologically primary. Ontological= the most general branch of metaphysics, concerned with the nature of being.
In the categories discussion, he doesn't talk about the distinction between matter and form, it comes later on in the Physics and then the Metaphysics. The "this" is ontologically primary in terms of what the "being" something, what something is. Why would it be wrong to say that primary ousia can't be primary from the standpoint of knowledge, it can't be the distinction between ontological and epistemological? Why would it be wrong to say that the "this" the perceptible encounter wouldn't be primary from the standpoint of knowledge? Because, whatever the categories are whatever the notions of say "horse" the "this" is a horse, the "this" is ontologically primary, but it can't be epistemologically primary because a "this" by itself is just a "this" the question "What is this" called a horse is to involve the categories of knowledge. Therefore, from a knowledge standpoint, secondary ousia, which is things like categories and context, they have primacy in knowledge. However, from the standpoint of "being" the perceptible "this" has primacy. This is just a technical way of distancing him from Plato. In the Metaphysics, the question of form is primary Ousia. Ousia =form in Metaphysics. In Metaphysics, the "this" is simply matter. Aristotle did not give up on Ousia as form. This matter and form is never separated for Aristotle, thus a composite of matter and form is in the Metaphysics. In realm of nature, form and matter can't be separated for Aristotle. If you only talk about matter, you have nothing definable. You never come across things without their form. God is only exception to form and matter together.
Ousia as form and essence. The essence of a thing is "what" it is, it gives us knowledge. Definition= essence. Bronze can't be essence of circle, the form is important, not the matter.
Can't use abstract math to explain a human. When it comes to knowledge, we must emphasize the ousia as form. It isn't that first you have material things, and then the mind adds form to it, whatever the particular thing is, it always was that form. Then when we learn about it, we actually just discover what the thing is. Therefore, it is a process of coming to understand the universal, the essence, but that was always there in the thing, it just needed to be done. So what he is emphasizing in the Metaphysics is the idea of ousia as form, as some kind of essence, but never separated from matter!
Ousia --1. Grammatically basic. 2. Ousia As Ontologically basic, something that exists in its own right. The 1st example is how humans speak, the 2nd example is how things really are, both are both side of the same coin.
Principle of Noncontradiction
Arche= principle, beginning and rule. Aristotle thought that this was the firmest of all principles. It is impossible for the same thing to both belong and not to belong to the same thing at the same time to the same thing in the same respect. An important governing thought in Western philosophy. A thing is what it is, it can't be equal to its opposite. Aristotle thought reality was organized this way. It has to do with both knowledge and being. Aristotle states that if this principle is true then it is the firmest of all principles both for knowledge and reality. In the same respect, what does it mean? It shifts depending on circumstances. From standpoint of knowledge and reality principle of noncontradiction is stable. The three factors of the principle are: the same thing, in the same time, in the same respect, is what Aristotle is calling the principle of noncontradiction. In order for knowledge to be reliable, these factors are in play. Can't be going up and down a hill at the same time. 1 of 3 factors has changed, time. A "hill" is both up and down but meaningless unless you think in relation of motion. Aristotle believes when it comes to knowledge and reality the principle of noncontradiction is most basic and most fundamental and evident principle, because without it we can't communicate or think about things. Aristotle explains well how we lead our life by the principle a very pragmatic explanation. This is a principle we live by as humans thus, no one can deny it!
If you talk about change as a potentiality, you have a way of solving the puzzle. This actually serves as a slap at Renee Descartes in the future wondering if he is conscious or in a dream state. All philosophy stems from wonder and puzzlement. Aristotle makes distinction between worthy puzzles or useless ones.
Emphasis between primary and secondary being, Ousia.
For Aristotle Ousia or being is not just a thing, many ways being can be understood. Primary Ousia is things perceptible in nature. Secondary Ousia or being is sometimes being is how we understand things, i.e., big or small, etc, this is how we talk about things. He stretches the way Ousia in many ways. Matter can't be primary being like atomists, nor form alone like Platonists. However, when we analyze beings, we can use secondary being. Idea of "is" or "being" will shift depending on what you are talking about. The term "being" has plurality to it, depending on how we regard it (like using a hammer as a paperweight). Even though Metaphysics emphasizes form, it is "this form." Primary thing is the "this."
He wants to move away from Plato's idea that we can separate matter from form. A things essence is going to be the ultimate answer to the question of what is being. However, a things essence can't be separated from its statement of thing, it is almost as though that this essence is going to mean the definition of a thing, "what it is." Then in some respects, it has the characteristics of a secondary being. If you want to know what is the big deal about the perceptible "this," the primary ousia? Again, and again, the best way you can get a handle on that is he is critiquing Plato! He wants to move away from Plato's idea that it is possible to understand beings apart from the material world. Aristotle does make certain commitments; he makes certain commitments to the idea that the primary sense of being must be used in nature that are evident to us.
The Platonist in Aristotle says if the mind desires and is naturally inclined to pursue knowledge and he gives us a map how does it acquire knowledge. The Platonist in Aristotle says in the Metaphysics that if all there is, is matter and form then there is always an element of elusiveness in things because matter cannot fully deliver how we know things. When he gets to the question of the Divine, he does so because he believes that the natural desire of the mind can know that it will not have a final resting place with respect to just composite things. Especially since these composite things are always changing because nature is the realm of movement and change and the idea of form will at least give us access to how we can know changing things and actuality and potentiality. Changing things will always have this element of excess, beyond the minds capacity to grasp.
His talk of the Divine is the idea that there is something in reality that will satisfy the minds' desire for the ultimate stable resting point. If change were the last word, the mind could never come to rest. This is what Heraclitus argued for, Aristotle didn't like it. He wants to grasp the final. For him the Divine is satisfaction for the mind to grasp reality.
Uber Ousia. Aristotle here is talking about 2 senses of eternity.
1. Endless time.
2. Timelessness. 1st is never begins, never ends this is eternity or infinity. 2nd is in order to understand whole world there has to be something, the unmoved mover.
Ideas of potentiality and actuality criticizes Platonic idea. Potentiality has idea of negation in it. Thus, a thing in nature always has actuality; we are always on the move. Divine is pure form and actuality without matter and potentiality. Ontology now moves to theology. This is his theological science. (Theology in the Metaphysics is speaking about God for Aristotle). In reality, composite of form and matter is always in motion until it ends. Any actualization has potentiality it is prior. Actuality is prior to potentiality; this is his ultimate metaphysical statement. Two ways Aristotle proves this idea. 1st is human reproduction brings us into being. Our parents actually reproduced us. 2nd is God the ultimate sense of actuality prior to potentiality.
Talking about other philosopher's ideas. Hesiod question of the Gods in poetry, night comes before day, thus we don't have access in the "dark" symbolic of precedence of something unknowable, and Aristotle doesn't like it. Thus, for him he has the unmoved mover.
The pure actuality of the Divine is Aristotle's nominee for the principal that explains why there is this movement in the first place. Limitation in nature is matter which is unstable but all things in nature strive to their potential. Thus, you have pure actuality of Divine. God is Prime mover or final cause not efficient cause for Aristotle.
Rational and non-rational potentiality. This is how Aristotle recognizes the phenomenology of human thought. What rational means here is human drama of seeking what might or not work out. Now rational is stable when you heat water it boils no other potentiality. Thus, non-rational movement is very regular. Human reason is precarious we may not use potentiality to reach actuality. When we practice medicine, it might not work out.
Theoria=contemplation. There are three kinds of ousia, all are a study of secondary ousia in some way.
1. Physics-study of material and moveable.
2. Mathematical-study of ousia that is non-moving, (1+1=2 always), but is derived from matter.
3. Theology is study of ousia that is non-moving and non-material.
This is scheme of understanding the nature of understanding something. 3rd level is big for Aristotle. 1st two levels have limitations to them. We begin from wonder (ignorance) philosophy is to illuminate wonder with answers. He doesn't deny Greek deities but the way poets depict them is deficient.
Movement is a way of understanding change we see this in the Physics. Movement is actualization of potential. Psuche=soul which is the word he uses for life. Things in nature that are alive. Soma=body. Plato separates soul from body, Aristotle doesn't. Aristotle's text De Anima is on "The Soul" is a philosophical biological treatise. We have three-part soul, plant, animal and human all are part of this.
I recommend Aristotle's works to anyone interested in obtaining a classical education, and those interested in philosophy. Aristotle is one of the most important philosophers and the standard that all others must be judged by.
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A Word or Two on This Translation
Rating  (3)
Date: 2007-03-15
5 out of 13 customers found this reveiw helpful
I preface this with one caveat: I am not a Greek scholar. I have, however, read this book, in toto, in this translation. I have also read, though not in its entirety, another translation. Joe Sachs, positively a very intelligent scholar of these texts, has tried to put it into what he considers to be true to the Greek. Again, I am not a scholar of the Greek language, but I think that Sachs goes 'overboard,' if you will, in presenting to us, the laypeople, a translation beyond what is really necessary to get the job done. By that, I mean that a traditional translation is more than adequate, so long as you don't try to get at the Thomistic textual analysis at first go-round, or so I'm told. There are several chapters (keeping in mind, this is Aristotle's Metaphysics we're talking about) where I had trouble discerning pages at a time, reading and re-reading just for an objective account of what Aristotle was saying, or trying to say through Dr. Sachs. The Metaphysics should be read; that is not the question. The question is whether this is the translation for you. I, for one, will say that it is not. Not because of uncanny foresight, but due to the difficult readability of such a complex exposition on reality, being, and, in the concluding chapters of course, God. So, I give this version 3 stars: as a text in itself, it is good; it is not a wonderfully understandable translation, however. I hope that this verbose review has been beneficial for you.
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Meticulous translator of Aristotle
Rating  (4)
Date: 2005-01-23
12 out of 14 customers found this reveiw helpful
I've not read Sachs's translation of the Metaphysics, though I did work through his version of the Physics during a summer at St. John's College (where he teaches). His Metaphysics was circulating as a xerox copy at the college bookstore; I'm glad to see it in print.
Anyone unfortunate enough (as I am) to read Aristotle in English rather than ancient Greek, can benefit from Sachs's translations, though it remains worthwhile to have something like the classic Oxford translation alongside, to compare their senses of the Greek text. Sachs's object is to recover what Aristotle may've been up to, by avoiding the Latinate terminology that haunts Aristotle studies and trying to find more "authentic" meanings for the Greek words. Whatever his ultimate success or failure, it's wonderful to have such a fresh approach to the translation of Aristotle available.
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Maybe Aristotle wasn't interested in philosophy
Rating (3)
Date: 2004-01-22
3 out of 49 customers found this reveiw helpful
This translation of Aristotle from the Greek directly into modern English makes use of the scholarship surrounding the efforts which have been most successful with Heidegger.`Thus, the way I understand *to ti en einai* departs from, but is rooted in, Owen's understanding of it. The same is true of my rendering *ousia* as "thinghood," when it is used in a general sense, and as "an independent thing" when it is used of singulars. I have heard two sorts or criticism of my use of the word thinghood in Aristotle's PHYSICS. The one sort, that it occasions laughter or embarrassment, is a general instance of Heidegger's observation in WHAT IS A THING? that philosophy is that at which thoughtless people laugh. Let the laughter or embarrassment subside, and then judge the meaning carried by the word, both on its own and in its context, on its merits. The other sort of criticism regrets the fact that thinghood is not as closely related to being as *ousia* is to *to on.* . . .' (p. xxxvii). "Lassie is an *ousia,* and the *ousia* of Lassie is dog." (p. xxxviii). Intellectuals need to pay attention to the concepts that are used in their own fields, if nowhere else, and Aristotle was close to the peak of ancient Greek intellectual attainment. "Aristotle invents a second word, being-at-work-staying-itself (entelecheia), converging with it in meaning, to sharpen and clarify his use of being-at-work, and he gives an array of examples in which we are meant to `see at a glance by means of analogy,' what it means (1048a 39)." (p. xxxix). In the beginning of this book, ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS, Translated by Joe Sachs, there is a Greek Glossary with 49 words or phrases on three pages, followed by an English Glossary of 43 words or phrases on eleven pages. "This is a slightly revised version of the glossary that appears with the translation of the PHYSICS, based upon those passages in which Aristotle explains and clarifies his own usage. Bekker page numbers from 184 to 267 refer to the PHYSICS; those from 980 to 1093 are in the METAPHYSICS." (p. xlix). Chapters are short, especially in Book V (Book Delta), which Joe Sachs calls "Things Meant in More than One Way." This has usually been considered "a dictionary, but Aristotle himself, at the beginnings of Books VII and X, says that it is about the various ways things are meant. The point is not to define words but to collect and organize the distinct senses of important words meant in more than one way. These ambiguities are not verbal but inherent in things, and Aristotle steadfastly preserves them." (p. 77, n. 1). I am not particularly fond of this book. If undergraduate college courses are meant to provide students with general outlook on likely events, and graduate schools at major universities are intended to select those students who want to qualify for cutting edge work in a highly specialized professional discipline, the works of Aristotle seem to be the high point of a Greek attempt to create an upper level above anything that had previously been considered possible. Alexander the Great, as a student of Aristotle, might be faulted for aspiring to far more than what could be useful, just as Heidegger seemed to be pushing for a German spirit that was sure to damn the rest of the world to misery when he assumed a place in the leadership of a German university backing Hitler and the Nazi party. I did not find Aristotle's approach to religion in Book VI to be inspiring, though it does seem to be intellectual. "But if there is anything that is everlasting and motionless and separate, . . . "And while it is necessary that all causes be everlasting, these are so most of all, since they are responsible for what appears to us of the divine. Therefore there would be three sorts of contemplative philosophy, the mathematical, the natural, and the theological; for it is not hard to see that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in a nature of this kind, and that the most honorable study must be about the most honorable class of things. The contemplative studies, then, are more worthy of choice than are the other kinds of knowledge, and this one is more worthy of choice than are the other contemplative studies." (pp. 110-111). This is a nice priority for an established church to maintain its dignity, but it is far more ancient than modern. It is not clear how infinite his "triangle containing two right angles" (p. 112) is supposed to be. Even his attempts to tiptoe around the major stereotypes of ancient bookworms seem limp. "For instance, it is neither always nor for the most part that someone pale has a refined education, but since it sometimes happens, it will be incidental (or if not, everything would be by necessity)." (p. 113). The Index only mentions three pages in Aristotle's text for Socrates, though Aristotle often uses his name as an example: "And since Socrates exerted himself about ethical matters and not at all about the whole of nature," (p. 14) and "so that whether Socrates is or is not, one might become like Socrates, and it is obvious that it would be the same even if Socrates were everlasting." (p. 23). Two generations of seeking lessons from Socrates, ignoring whatever meaning the hemlock had, took place before we find Aristotle finally admitting "For there are two things one might justly credit Socrates with, arguments by example and universal definition," (p. 260). A real philosopher ought to do better than that.
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